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pricing	 of	 other	 comprehensive	 income.	 Findings	 show	 that	 for	 firms	 with	 weak	 governance	
mechanisms,	 other	 comprehensive	 income	 is	 value	 relevant,	 but	 is	 more	 significantly	 priced	 for	
strong	 governance	 firms.	 This	 study	 finds	 a	 similar	 result	 when	 other	 comprehensive	 income	
interact with individual elements of corporate governance factor. Therefore, corporate governance 
mitigates reliability concerns associated with fair value earnings, agency cost will be minimised and 
investors are more likely to view other comprehensive income as more value relevant. It is therefore 
recommended that reporting entities should pursue best corporate governance practices in order to 
enhance	investors’	confidence	in	the	reliability	of	other	comprehensive	income.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Other comprehensive income, Value relevance.
Introduction
An old and unresolved challenge facing standard-
setters and users of accounting information 
centres is the choice of a more appropriate 
method	 of	 assessing	 the	 periodic	 financial	
position and performance (Kanagaretnam, 
Mathieu, & Shehata, 2009). The proponents 
of the inclusive approach contend that all 
changes in the value of assets and liabilities 
measured at the market value are derived from 
the income statement. Such an approach of 
measuring periodic performance is considered 
more appropriate because it explicitly shows 
all changes in the value of assets and liabilities 
at	the	beginning	and	at	the	end	of	the	financial	
period (Firescu, 2015). Thus, by presenting all 
cash	flow	changes	 resulting	 for	both	 fair	value	
changes	 in	balance	 sheet	 items	 and	 cash	flows	
from	operating	 performance,	 users	 of	 financial	
statements can easily distinguish between value 
creation and value distribution (Chambers, 
Linsmeier, Shakespeare, & Sougiannis, 2007; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Mechelli & Cimini, 
2014; Firescu, 2015). This is contrary to 
the current operating performance approach 
where	 temporary	 changes	 (dirty	 surplus	flows)	
arising from non-core operations bypass the 
income statement and are reported directly 
in the balance sheet under the owners’ equity 
section (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Lee & 
Park, 2013). To justify the desirability of 
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the all inclusive income approach, such as 
Comprehensive Income (CI), it has been argued 
that	reporting	dirty	surplus	flows	directly	to	the	
balance sheet “may encourage management to 
opportunistically manage earnings. This may 
cause misleading inferences to be drawn by the 
users of accounting information” (Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2009). Therefore, considering the 
comprehensiveness of the all inclusive approach 
to	 measure	 financial	 performance,	 the	 CI-type	
statement displays all relevant components of 
income (Hirst & Hopkins, 1998; Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2009; Lee & Park, 2013; Firescu, 2015).
Seemingly, these anomalies are often curtailed 
through effective corporate governance (CG) 
practices which can deter unethical behaviour 
(Bartov et al., 2007; Song et al., 2010; Lee & 
Park, 2013). Corporate monitoring curtails 
opportunistic tendencies, hence enhancing the 
reliability	and	integrity	of	the	financial	reporting	
process (Song et al., 2010; Lee & Park, 2013). 
Thus, in valuing CI and OCI, investors may place 
different weights on these earnings numbers 
based	on	 the	firms’	CG	mechanisms	 (Habib	&	
Azim,	2008;	Song	et	al.,	2010;	Lopes	&	Walker,	
2012; Lee & Park, 2013). 
Corporate governance practices in Nigeria 
have been observed since the last decade with 
the promulgation of the Corporate Governance 
Code 2003 (Adegbite, 2012). Due to the 
ineffectiveness observed in the 2003 governance 
code in addressing corporate challenges and part 
of the arrangement for transition to the IFRS, 
the federal government through the Security and 
Exchange Commission issued a revised code 
of corporate governance in 2011 (Adegbite, 
2012). Therefore, given these institutional 
reforms, users are likely to be become more 
confident	 in	 the	 information	 they	are	provided.	
This study aims to provide empirical evidence 
as to how CG mechanisms could ameliorate 
investors’ perception of the reliability of other 
comprehensive income (OCI) in Nigeria. The 
CG mechanisms proposed in this study are 
audit committee independence, audit committee 
financial	expertise,	frequency	of	audit	committee	
meetings,	audit	committee	size,	effectiveness	of	
internal control system and external auditor’s 
reputation, which can enhance the value relevance 
of CI and OCI. The contribution of this study 
is	that	the	findings	expand	the	understanding	of	
the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the reliability of fair value earnings from the 
Nigerian	perspective.	Further,	the	findings	show	
that disclosure relating to IAS 16, IAS 19 and 
IFRS 7 are value relevant and have a positive 
influence	 on	 the	 value	 relevance	 of	OCI	 items	
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Lastly, 
the	 findings	 promote	 benchmarking	 among	
companies by setting high best practices in 
financial	 reporting	 and	 disclosure	 to	 enhance	
market discipline and reduce uncertainties of 
fair value earnings.
Prior Studies and 
Hypotheses Development
Value Relevance of Other Comprehensive Income 
and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The valuation effect of other comprehensive 
income has been recognised in the extant 
literature. Such accounting will “provide the 
opportunity for managers to manage earnings 
by	 selectively	 including	 realized	 gains	 in	
earnings	 and	 selectively	 excluding	 unrealized	
losses from earnings’’ (FASB, 1993). This is 
typically because other comprehensive income 
includes several “mark-to-market and mark-to-
model” types of adjustments. When the degree 
of judgment and subjectivity in estimating 
fair-value estimates is high, it increases the 
dissenting concern about the reliability of such 
estimates (Maines & McDaniel, 2000; Song et 
al., 2010; Lee & Park, 2013). Consequently, 
actual results could differ materially from the 
estimates, hence creating additional challenges 
for	 users	 and	 auditors	 of	 financial	 information	
(Christensen et al., 2012; Lee & Park, 2013). This 
agency cost of information asymmetry is proven 
to be mitigated through effective corporate 
governance practices and market participants 
prize	 the	 strength	 of	 corporate	 governance	 in	
investment analysis (Maines & Wahlen, 2006; 
Song et al., 2010; Lee & Park, 2013). 
Because other comprehensive income includes 
several	 dirty	 surplus	 flows	 measured	 using	
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different levels of hierarchy information, 
investors are less likely to have the capacity to 
verify the reliability of such estimates (Lee & 
Park, 2013). Nevertheless, previous evidence 
documented enhanced quality and reliability 
of	financial	information	when	external	auditors	
were	involved	in	the	financial	reporting	process	
(Ismail & Chandler, 2005; Francis & Wang, 
2008; DeFond, 2010; Francis & Michas, 2013; 
Lee & Park, 2013). As such, market participants 
could place different weights for an accounting 
number	 audited	 by	Big	 4	 and	 non-Big	 4	firms	
because	of	the	perception	that	Big	4	firms	produce	
higher	quality	audits	than	non-Big	4	firms.	These	
assumptions make the nomenclature of Big 4 an 
effective corporate governance mechanism for 
capital market operations (Francis & Michas, 
2013; Lee & Park, 2013). It is, therefore, 
arguable that involvement of external auditors 
could	 influence	 the	 investors’	 pricing	 of	 other	
comprehensive income in Nigeria.
More so, the audit committee, a vital corporate 
governance oversight function, may have 
a disciplining effect on the management’s 
discretion in fair value determination. Several 
regulatory and legislative reforms such as the 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 
(BRC) 1999 and the Sarbanes Oxley-Act 2002 
underscore the importance of best practices of 
audit	committees	 in	financial	 reporting	quality.	
For instance, the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors sitting on the boards has been positively 
associated with the comprehensiveness of 
financial	 disclosure	 (Chen	&	 Jaggi,	 2000)	 and	
negatively associated with earnings management 
(Klein, 2002; Jenkins, 2003) and more reliable 
reported earnings (Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). By 
contrast,	 Rainsbury	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 and	 Suárez	
et al. (2013) revealed that the proportion of 
independent directors did not enhance the 
quality	of	financial	reporting,	whilst	the	study	by	
Abdullah and Ku-Ismail (1999) found that only 
the	influence	of	a	firm’s	size	on	audit	committee	
effectiveness	was	significant.	
The frequency of audit committee meetings gives 
the committee members ample time to review 
internal	control	systems	and	a	firm’s	overall	audit	
process	to	ensure	good	financial	reporting	quality	
(Barua et al., 2010; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). In 
related studies, the frequency of audit committee 
meetings was found to be negatively associated 
with discretionary current accruals (Xie et al., 
2003) and more likely lead to updating members 
on current auditing issues, and members were 
more	 diligent	 in	 fulfilling	 their	 duties	 (Yasin	
& Nelson, 2012). Furthermore, the presence 
of	 financial	 and	 auditing	 experts	 sitting	 on	 an	
audit	committee	leads	to	higher	quality	financial	
statements.	 The	 financial	 expertise	 of	 audit	
committee members seems to be a fundamental 
factor in monitoring and forestalling earnings 
management	and	financial	 restatements	 (Xie	et	
al., 2003; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). Davidson 
et al. (2004), DeFond et al. (2005) and Woidtke 
and Yeh (2013) observed a positive stock market 
reaction to good news management forecasts 
for	 firms	with	 financial	 and	 audit	 expertise	 on	
their audit committee. Experts sitting on these 
committees are effective at reducing internal 
control	 problems	 and	 inefficiency	 in	 financial	
reporting (Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Yasin & 
Nelson, 2012). 
In the same vein, effective implementation and 
monitoring of internal control systems can assist 
in	detecting	and	preventing	aggressive	financial	
reporting,	 hence	 improving	 financial	 reporting	
quality	and	integrity	(Rezaee,	2004;	Kim	&	Park,	
2009). Firms without material internal weakness 
problems are less likely to have issues relating to 
estimation errors, intentional manipulation and 
biased forecasts by management that affect the 
quality of reported information (Brown et al., 
2014). This is because a sound internal control 
system allows the internal audit staff to monitor 
the preparation of the annual report effectively 
(Rezaee,	 2004).	 Overall,	 the	 influence	 of	
an auditor’s reputation, audit committee 
characteristics and an internal control system 
is unequivocally important in addressing the 
agency cost of information asymmetry. Thus, 
if the assumption is made that the strength of 
corporate governance mechanism reduces the 
level of professional judgment involved in fair 
value measurement, one might expect enhanced 
reliability of other comprehensive income. It is 
therefore hypothesised that:
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H
1 
:   The strength of the corporate 
governance positively influences the 
reliability of other comprehensive 




:   The individual element of corporate 
governance positively influences the 
reliability of other comprehensive 




All data regarding accounting numbers (except 
for other comprehensive income items) and 
measures	 of	 firm	 value	 were	 collected	 from	
the Thomson Reuters Database. Missing 
information	from	the	database	and	nonfinancial	
data were hand-collected from annual reports 
(Barth & Clinch, 1998; Cahan et al., 2000). 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of the sample 
calculations. Panel A splits the full sample into 
financial	and	nonfinancial	firms	for	years	2010	




were excluded due to missing data or because all 
the  three components of other comprehensive 
income	 are	 zero.	 Because	 this	 study	 used	 the	
price model that required share price as a 
dependent variable and the return model that 
also required dividends for computing stock 
returns,	an	additional	100	firm-year	observations	
(35	 financial	 and	 65	 nonfinancial)	 for	 firms	
without data on share prices and dividends were 
excluded.	 Futhermore,	 another	 19	 firm-year	
observations	(35	financial	and	65	nonfinancial)	
were deleted because of the extremely large 
data	 that	 would	 result	 in	 abnormal	 influence.	
Thus,	 the	 final	 sample	 presented in Panel 
A consists	 of	 349	 firm-year	 observations	
(123	 financial	 and	 226	 nonfinancial). Panel 
B provides a breakdown of the  sub-sectors 
of	 the	 major	 classifications	 of	 financial	 and	
nonfinancial	firms.	Banks,	insurance	companies	
and	investment	and	financial	services	constitute	
the	 financial	 sector.	 The	 sample	 firms	 in	 the	
nonfinancial	category	are	from	many	industries,	
with the greatest proportion from consumer 
goods, industrial goods, services and oil and 
gas;	and	agricultural	and	healthcare	firms	being	
the least. Panel B also delineates the number of 
firms	in	each	industry,	which	demonstrates	that	
no single industry dominates the sample. Panel 
C combines the sample and it is the identical 
requirement for the formation and disclosure 
of corporate governance practices for both 
financial	 and	 non-financial	 firms	 as	 stipulated	
by the CAMA 1990 amended in 2004 and SEC 
2011.	Second,	all	firms	reporting	under	the	IFRS	
framework are required to mark-to-market or 
mark-to-model certain assets and liabilities and 
to report fair value gains and losses using the fair 
value hierarchy. Third, compliance with relevant 
accounting standards relating to OCI is almost 
homogeneous	 for	 financial	 and	 nonfinancial	
firms	with	respect	to	IAS	16	and	IAS	19.	Fourth,	
given the low frequency of fair value reporting 
and the rigorousness of analysis, it will be more 
appropriate to combine the sample (Jones & 
Smith, 2011; Mechelli & Cimini, 2014). 
Table 1
Sample Calculation for Firms that Passed the Filtering Process
Panel A: Sample Calculation for Years 2010 to 2014      Financial 				Nonfinancial Total
Total	firm-year	observations 260 685 945
Less:
Firm-year	observations	with	zero	other	comprehensive	income	items 94 383 477
(continued)
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Total	observations	with	non-zero	other	comprehensive	income	items 166 302 468
Less:
Firm-year observations with no information on share price/dividend 35 65 100
Firm-year observations due to extremely large share price 8 11 19
Firm-year observations 123 226 349
Panel B: Composition by Industry 
 Firm-year 
observations % Number	of	firms %
Financial 
Banks 68 55.28 18 50
Insurance 46 37.4 14 38.89
Investment	and	financial	services 9 7.32 4 11.11
Total 123 100 36 100
Nonfinancial 
Agriculture 9 3.98 4 4.94
Conglomerate 12 5.31 5 6.17
Construction 17 7.52 6 7.41
Consumer goods 63 27.88 21 25.93
Healthcare 13 5.75 4 4.94
Oil and gas 19 8.41 7 8.64
Industrial goods 58 25.66 19 23.46
Services 35 15.49 15 18.51
Total 226 100 81 100
Panel C: Combined Sample Observations
Total number of observations 349
Less	firms-year	observations	without	full	annual	report																																																																																																									 22
Firm-year  observations 327
Note:	The	sample	comprises	Nigerian	firms	with	at	least	one	item	of	other	comprehensive	income	with		
annual reports between 2010 and 2014.
Research Model
Corporate governance mechanisms play a 
broader role in limiting the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers (Song et al., 2010). 
A case can be made for reduced agency costs 
of information asymmetry to the extent that 
corporate governance mechanisms limit the 
managerial	manipulation	of	financial	reporting,	
especially other comprehensive income,. 
Consequently, the strength of corporate 
governance can enhance the quality of other 
comprehensive income. Therefore, this section 
modelled the role of corporate governance 
mechanism on the investors’ pricing of other 
comprehensive income as:   
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where SP is the share price four months after the financial year end. BVE is measured as 
the book value of common equity at the end of the fiscal year deflated by the number of 
outstanding shares (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Mechelli & Cimini, 2014). NI refers to 
earnings after tax of a company at the end of the financial year (Dhaliwal et al., 1999; 
Cahan et al., 2000; Mechelli & Cimini, 2014). OCI is the sum of items of other 
comprehensive income (dirty surplus flows), which includes: a) gains and losses on non-
current assets (REV); b) gains and losses on available-for-sale financial securities (SEC); 
and c) actuarial gains and losses on defined benefit plans (PEN) as contained in the 
Nigerian version of IFRS. Other comprehensive income and the components are scaled 
by the outstanding shares (Wang et al.,2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Mechelli & 
Cimini, 2014). BCGSCORE is a factor score of the corporate governance mechanism 
using the Principal Components Analysis. The score is obtained by taking the average 
score from audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee 
expertise, audit committee meetings, auditor’s reputation, and no material control 
weakness. ACIND is the ratio of the independent audit committee members to ACSIZE 
(Klein, 2002; Habib & Azim, 2008, Suárez et al., 2013; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013. ACSIZE 
is the actual number of audit committee members (Habib & Azim, 2008; Yasin & 
Nelson, 2012; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). ACEXP is the proportion of audit committee 
members possessing professional accounting qualifications relative to audit committee 
size (Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007, Rainsbury et al., 2009; Yasin & Nelson, 2012). 
ACMET is the number of meetings conducted during the year (Barua et al., 2010;, Yasin 
& Nelson, 2012; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). AUDR is coded 1 for companies audited by a 
Big 4 firm and 0 for companies audited by a non-Big 4 firm (Song et al., 2010; Lee & 
Park, 2013). NMICW is given the value of 1 if a firm has not disclosed any material 
internal control weakness and 0 if otherwise (Doyle et al., 2007; Hammersley et al., 2008; 
Song et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2014). To test the value relevance differences between 
high and low governance firms, the data was partitioned into high and low governance 
firms. This was achieved by computing a RANK variable based on the median value of 
Panel C: Combined Sample Observations 
Total number of observations 
   
349 
Less firms-year observations without full annual report                                                                                                        22 
Firm-year  observations  
 
327 
Note: The sample comprises Nigerian firms with at least one item of other comprehensive income with  
annual reports between 2010 and 2014. 
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where SP is the share price four months after 
the	financial	year	end.	BVE is measured as the 
book value of common equity at the end of the 
fiscal	year	deflated	by	the	number	of	outstanding	
shares (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Mechelli & 
Cimini, 2014). NI refers to earnings after tax of a 
company	at	the	end	of	the	financial	year	(Dhaliwal	
et al., 1999; Cahan et al., 2000; Mechelli & 
Cimini, 2014). OCI is the sum of items of other 
comprehensive	 income	 (dirty	 surplus	 flows),	
which includes: a) gains and losses on non-
current assets (REV); b) gains and losses on 
available-for-sale	financial	securities	(SEC);	and	
c)	actuarial	gains	and	 losses	on	defined	benefit	
plans (PEN) as contained in the Nigerian version 
of IFRS. Other comprehensive income and 
the components are scaled by the outstanding 
shares (Wang et al.,2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 
2009; Mechelli & Cimini, 2014). BCGSCORE 
is a factor score of the corporate governance 
mechanism using the Principal Components 
Analysis. The score is obtained by taking the 
average	score	 from	audit	committee	 size,	audit	
committee independence, audit committee 
expertise, audit committee meetings, auditor’s 
reputation, and no material control weakness. 
ACIND is the ratio of the independent audit 
committee members to ACSIZE (Klein, 2002; 
Habib	 &	 Azim,	 2008,	 Suárez	 et	 al.,	 2013;	
Woidtke & Yeh, 2013. ACSIZE is the actual 
number of audit committee members (Habib & 
Azim,	2008;	Yasin	&	Nelson,	2012;	Woidtke	&	
Yeh, 2013). ACEXP is the proportion of audit 
committee members possessing professional 
accounting	 qualifications	 relative	 to	 audit	
committee	 size	 (Zhang,	 Zhou,	 &	 Zhou,	 2007,	
Rainsbury et al., 2009; Yasin & Nelson, 2012). 
ACMET is the number of meetings conducted 
during the year (Barua et al., 2010;, Yasin & 
Nelson, 2012; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). AUDR 
is	coded	1	for	companies	audited	by	a	Big	4	firm	
and	0	for	companies	audited	by	a	non-Big	4	firm	
(Song et al., 2010; Lee & Park, 2013). NMICW 
is	given	the	value	of	1	if	a	firm	has	not	disclosed	
any material internal control weakness and 0 
if otherwise (Doyle et al., 2007; Hammersley 
et al., 2008; Song et al., 2010; Brown et al., 
2014). To test the value relevance differences 
between	high	and	low	governance	firms,	the	data	
was partitioned into high and low governance 
firms.	 This	 was	 achieved	 by	 computing	 a	
RANK variable based on the median value of 
BCGSORE. To	 differentiate	 firms	 based	 on	
best practices, BCGSCORE was split at the 
median to cluster the sample into two groups. 
The	first	group	was	the	strong	governance	firms	
(entities with an aggregate score above the 
median) and the second group was the weak 
governance	 firms	 (entities	 with	 an	 aggregate	
score below the median). Observations with a 
score above the median value were coded 1 and 
0 for observations with aggregate scores less 
than the median value (Song et al., 2010). LNI 
is	coded	as	1	for	negative	net	income	firms	and	
0 if otherwise. LOCI is coded as 1 for negative 
OCI	 firms	 and	 0	 if	 otherwise.	 The	 control	
variables	are	firm	size	(FSIZE),	foreign	investor	
ownership (FLIB) and industry (IND). FSIZE 
is	the	log	of	market	capitalization.	FLIB is the 
percentage of shares held by foreign investors 
and IND is NSE SIC code.
Results and Analysis
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for 
regression variables from 2010 to 2014. The 
mean (median) of SP was ₦9.78 (₦2.68) Naira 
for	the	period	of	2010	to	2014.	The	pooled	five-
year mean (median) net income was 0.37 (0.10) 
billion. The average (median) OCI was 0.03 
(0.01), which was far lower than the net income. 
For corporate governance variables, the mean 
proportion of audit committee independence 
(ACIND) was 0.41 %, which was less than 
the 51% recommended by CAMA 1990 and 
SCE 2011. The mean ratio of audit committee 
expertise (ACEXP) was 0.07, indicating that not 
all	firms	had	a	chartered	accountant	sitting	on	the	
committee. This result is against the provision of 
CAMA 1990 and SEC 2011 which stipulate that 
there should be at least one chartered accountant.
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Table 3 delineates the correlation matrix of 
accounting earnings, corporate governance and 
control variables. The book value of equity, net 
income and OCI for the pooled sample were 
positively correlated with the SP. The corporate 
governance and control variables included were 
moderately correlated. Overall, the strength 
of the relationship between the independent 
variables were within the acceptable limit. In 
Table 3 there are  no predictor variables with 
correlation above 0.7, suggesting the absence of 
serious multicollinearity problems.
Table 4 presents the results of the overall effect 
of BCGSCORE on the value relevance of OCI 
and the valuation differences between strong and 
weak	governance	firms.	The	valuation	effect	of	
BCGSCORE on OCI is presented in Panel A. The 
coefficient	on	OCI	is	interpreted	as	the	valuation	
of	 OCI	 for	 the	 full	 sample.	 The	 coefficients	
on the interaction term represents incremental 
valuations of OCI given corporate governance 
mechanism. In Panel A, BVE and NI are positive 
and	statistically	significant	at	1%.	As	expected,	
the	coefficient	of	OCI	is	positive	and	significant	
at 10%. This indicates that aggregate dirty 
surplus	flows	is	weakly	priced,	perhaps,	because	
it comprises of several fair value adjustments 
involving different valuation inputs (Song et al., 
2010).	It	is	also	noteworthy	that	the	coefficients	
on the interaction term (OCI*BCGSCORE) is 
positive	and	statistically	significant	at	5%.	This	
result suggests an incremental value relevance 
of OCI when conditioned for BCGSCORE 
as Song et al. (2010) and Lee and Park (2013) 
documented. This suggests that the perceived 
effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms may 
motivate investors to place heavy weights on 
reported accounting earnings. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the result of the sample 
partitioned for strong and weak corporate 
governance	firms	based	on	the	median	value	of	
BCGSCORE.	 The	 coefficient	 of	 OCI	 without	
interaction is interpreted as fair value valuation 
of	 low	 governance	 firms.	 The	 coefficient	 of	
the interaction term (OCI*RANK) captures 
the incremental valuation when moving from 
weak	 to	 strong	 corporate	 governance	 firms.	
The result in Panel B shows that the regression 
coefficient	on	the	book	value	of	equity	and	net	
income	 are	 positive	 and	 significantly	 better	 at	
1%.	The	coefficient	of	OCI	without	interaction	
terms	 is	 positive	 and	 significant	 at	 10%	 as	
predicted for β7 in Equation 1. Interestingly, the 
coefficient	of	the	interaction	term	is	positive	and	
significant	at	10%.	To	determine	the	 impact	of	
strong corporate governance on the valuation 
of	 OCI,	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 non-interaction	
term (OCI) and that of the interaction term 
(OCI*BCGRANK) are added. The sum of 
these	coefficients	indicates	the	impact	of	strong	
corporate governance on the value relevance of 
OCI as Song et al. (2010) posited.
Table 4
Regressions Using Governance Rank Covering 2010- 2014 when n=327 (Dependent Variable= 
Share Price)
Variable Panel A














CONS +/- -3.49. 1.30 -2.67*** -3.99 1.32 2.54***
BVEit + 0.67 0.26 3.67*** 0.64 0.22 2.92***
NIit + 0.70 0.17 4.24*** 0.73 0.17 4.26***
(continued)
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Variable Panel A







OCIit + 0.32 0.18 1.73* 0.32 0.19 1.74*
BCGSCOREit ? -0.02 0.07 -0.34
RANKit + - - - -0.01 0.21 -0.04
LNIit + -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.14
LOCIit - -0.12 0.14 -0.08 0.04 0.13 0.30
OCI*BCGSCOREit 0.16 0.07 2.15** - - -
OCI*RANKit + - - - 0.56 0.33 1.69*
LNI*NIit ? 0.11 0.09 1.29 0.16 0.10 1.70*
LOCI*OCIit               + 0.06 0.09 0.60 0.03 0.09 0.35
FSIZEit + 0.16 0.56 3.48*** 0.16 0.06 2.85***
INDit + 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.00 0.00 1.39
FLIBit + 0.14 0.14 2.78*** 0.14 0.04 3.45***
F-statistics 5.77*** 5.76***
R2 35.08% 35.86%
Notes: BVEit = per share book value of common equity; NIit = net income per share; OCIit = aggregate other 
comprehensive income per share;  BCGSCOREit = corporate governance scores; RANKit = the median rank 
of BCGSCOREit, ranging from 0 to 1; LNIit and LOCIit are indicator variables that equal 1if earnings are 
negative and 0 if otherwise. OCI*BCGSCOREit and OCI*RANKit are interactions with OCI; LNI*NIit and 
LOCI*OCIit are interaction	terms	for	loss	firms	and	i and t	refer	to	firm	and	year.	
*,	**,	and	***	denote	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	and	1%	levels	respectively.
For	strong	governance	firms,	valuations	of	OCI	
increased to near 1 (0.88 sum of 0.32 and 0.56), 
suggesting an incremental value relevance 
of OCI given strong corporate governance 
practices.	 This	 finding	 provides	 evidence	 that	
OCI	of	 strong	corporate	governance	firms	was	
more positively priced than those of the weak 
governance companies. Thus, H1 is supported.
To test H2, Equation 1 is estimated separately 
for each element of corporate governance. 
Table 5 presents the results of the effect of 
individual elements of corporate governance on 
the valuation of other comprehensive income. 
The elements tested are the audit committee 
independence,	 audit	 committee	 financial	
expertise,	audit	committee	size,	audit	committee	
meetings, auditor’s reputation and internal 
control effectiveness. The results for Model 1 





Model	 3	 of	Table	 5	 shows	 that	 the	 coefficient	
on the interaction between OCI and audit 
committee	size	(OCI*ACSIZE)	was	positive	and	
significant.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 composition	
of an audit committee in terms of number 
positively	 influenced	 the	 value	 relevance	 of	
other comprehensive income. This result is in 
the same direction of Yang and Krishnan (2005) 
who	documented	a	positive	influence	of	a	large	
audit	 committee	 on	 the	 financial	 reporting	
quality.
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Table 5




















































































































































































































F-statistics 13.87*** 14.27*** 14.11*** 14.12*** 14.44*** 11.44***
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327
R2 34.65% 35.29% 35.04% 25.05% 35.56% 35.57%
Notes: BVEit = per share book value of common equity; NIit = net income per share; OCIit = other comprehensive 
income per share; GOVELEMit = the score of individual governance variable; OCI*GOVELEMit = the interaction 
between	OCI	and	audit	committee	 independence	(ACIND);	audit	committee	financial	expertise	(ACEXP)	and	
audit	committee	size	(ACSIZE)	measured	by	the	number	of	directors	sitting	on	the	audit	committee,	frequency	of	
annual audit committee meetings (ACMET); auditor’s reputation (AUDR) assigned the value of 1 if Big_4 and 
0	if	otherwise	and	an	indicator	of	whether	the	firm	has	not	disclosed	any	material	control	weakness	(NMICW).	
LNIit and LOCIit are indicator variables which equal 1 if earnings are negative and 0 if otherwise; LNI*NIit  and 
LOCI*OCIit are interaction terms	for	loss	firms	and	i and t	refer	to	firm	and	year.	
*,	**,	and	***denote	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	and	1%	levels	respectively
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For Model 4 of Table 5, an audit committee that 
meets frequently to review the internal accounting 
controls and audit process tends to be more 
effective	and	focused	on	the	financial	reporting	
quality and hence the quality of accounting 
information (Barua et al., 2010; Woidtke & 
Yeh,	2013).	In	this	study,	the	coefficient	on	the	
interaction between audit committee meeting 
and aggregate other comprehensive income 
(OCI*ACMET) was positive and statistically 
significant	 at	 5%.	 This	 	 implies	 that	 the	
frequency of meetings has an incremental effect 
on the value relevance of other comprehensive 
income. As documented in previous studies, 
the frequency of audit committee meetings 
is important in keeping the members abreast 
of	 the	 relevant	 financial	 reporting	 and	 current	
audit issues (Yasin & Nelson, 2012). To further 
highlight the importance of the audit committee 
meetings, regulators, among others, expressed 
diligence of the audit committee as a function of 
the number of audit committee meetings because 
it	 is	 critical	 in	 fulfilling	 their	 audit	 committee	
oversight function (Yasin & Nelson, 2012).
Another element of corporate governance 
included in the BCGSCORE is the external 
auditor type. Model 5 of Table 5 presents the 
result of the interaction between external auditor 
type	and	OCI.	The	coefficient	of	the	interaction	
term (OCI*AUDR) was positive and statistically 
significant	 at	 1%.	 This	 finding	 concurs	 with	
Song et al. (2010), Lee and Lee (2011), Francis 
and Michas (2013) and Lee and Park (2013) 
who investigated the role of an auditor’s 
reputation in reducing the subjectivity of fair 
value	measurement.	Because	Big	4	audit	firms	
possess vast professional and technical skills 
and have reputations at stake, they have stronger 
incentives	for	ensuring	that	financial	statements	
reflect	the	true	and	fair	view	to	maintain	public	
trust on reporting entities. Thus, an external 
auditor’s involvement in the operation of 
Nigerian capital market could play a broader 
role in limiting the opportunistic behavior of 
the managers from manipulating accounting 
amounts and consequently reduce agency cost 
and increases the reliability of earnings. 
Further, the result presented in Model 6 of Table 
5	 suggests	 positive	 and	 significant	 interaction	
(OCI*NMICW) between no material internal 
control	 weakness	 and	 OCI.	 This	 finding	 is	
in line with Brown et al. (2014).  Information 
about no material internal control weakness 
signals	 the	 soundness	 of	 the	 sample	 firms	
internal control system, which is typical in 
detecting	 and	 preventing	 aggressive	 financial	
reporting (Brown et al., 2014). Effective internal 
control system could curtail management’s 
forecasts and estimates so that they do not lead 
to	misrepresentation	 of	 the	 financial	 statement	
(Gordon et al., 2006). As documented in 
previous	 studies,	 this	 study	affirmed	 that	high-
quality of internal control system is negatively 
associated with intentional manipulation and 
estimation errors, suggesting an incremental 
value relevance of OCI when conditioned for no 
material internal control weakness. 
Overall,	 this	 finding	 provides	 strong	 evidence	
on the greater impact of corporate governance 
mechanism on the valuation of OCI. Because 
fair	value	inputs	are	less	verifiable	by	investors	
and prone to greater management estimation 
errors as well as intentional manipulation, 
market	participants	may	perceive	OCI	of	firms	
with strong corporate governance to be more 
value relevant. Thus, the individual items 
continue to support H2 on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the value relevance 
of OCI in the NSE market.
Conclusion
This study investigated whether investors placed 
different weight on other comprehensive income 
based on the strength of the corporate governance 
mechanism.	Based	on	the	data	from	firms	listed	
on the NSE market, the test of the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism on investors’ 
pricing of other comprehensive income was 
consistent with our prediction. We found that the 
value relevance of other comprehensive income 
varied	with	the	strength	of	the	firm’s	corporate	
governance. This implies that investors place 
different weight on other comprehensive income 
based on the strength of the corporate governance 
mechanism.	 For	 firms	 with	 weak	 governance	
mechanisms, other comprehensive income 
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is	 value	 relevant,	 but	 was	 more	 significantly	
priced	for	strong	governance	firms.	The	results	
of the six individual governance measures also 
continue to support the greater importance 
of governance practice on the valuation of 
other comprehensive income. Given that other 
comprehensive income represents an accounting 
earnings generated from various dirty surplus 
flows,	information	asymmetry	is	expected	to	be	
high for such earnings. The observed increase in 
the explanatory power of other comprehensive 
income when interacting with the corporate 
governance factor score is supportive of the 
argument that effective corporate governance 
curtails information asymmetry through reduced 
management estimation errors or induced 
measurement biases. Therefore, to the extent 
that corporate governance mitigates reliability 
concerns associated with fair value earnings, 
agency cost will be minimised and investors 
are more likely to view other comprehensive 
income as more value relevant.
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